We propose a causal model theory to explain asymmetries in judgments of the intentionality of a foreseen side-effect that is either negative or positive (Knobe, 2003). The theory is implemented as a Bayesian network relating types of mental states, actions, and consequences that integrates previous hypotheses. It appeals to two inferential routes to judgment about the intentionality of someone else's action: bottom-up from action to desire and top-down from character and disposition. Support for the theory comes from three experiments that (...) test the prediction that bottom-up inference should occur only when the actor's primary objective is known. The model fits intentionality judgments reasonably well with no free parameters. (shrink)

Theoretical perspectives on non-suicidal self-injury have long underscored the affective regulating properties of NSSI. Less attention has been given to the processes through which individuals choose to engage in NSSI, specifically, to regulate their distress. In the present study, we tested one theoretical model in which recent stressful experiences facilitates NSSI through emotional reactivity. Further, we tested whether the indirect link between stressful experiences and NSSI was moderated by several NSSI specific risk factors. Given the widespread prevalence of NSSI among (...) community-based samples of adolescents and emerging adults, we surveyed 1,125 emerging adults in first-year university at a large academic institution. Participants completed an online survey three times, reporting on their recent stressful experiences in university, emotional reactivity, NSSI, as well as three NSSI specific risk factors. As expected, path analysis revealed that there was a significant indirect effect of recent stressful experiences on NSSI engagement, through emotional reactivity. However, this effect was maintained across moderator analyses. These novel findings underscore the salient role of proximally occurring stressors in the prediction of NSSI among emerging adults in university, and can inform developing theoretical perspectives on NSSI. (shrink)

This paper argues that the central philosophical movement in the complex history of Buddhism that originated with Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha and carried on by Nāgārjuna (among other later Buddhist philosophers) shares some common themes with the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey. These themes are the rejection of traditional metaphysics as definitive of philosophy, a return to the correct understanding of the nature of experience, and a particular view about the conduct and nature of philosophy. Dewey is used to illuminate (...) such controversial problems in the Buddhist tradition as why the Buddha is silent about metaphysical questions, what it means to say that everything is anitya, and how we are to understand Nāgārjuna's key concepts of prattyasamutpāda and únyatá. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna contends that the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), properly understood, constitutes the philosophical basis for the rejection and avoidance of all metaphysical theories and concepts (including causation). The companion doctrine of "śūnyatā" constitutes the denial of metaphysical realism (or "essentialism") but does not imply an anti-realist, conventionalist view of reality (as Jay Garfield maintains). "Pratītyasamutpāda," the true doctrine or, literally, "the exact or real nature of the case," is really two-sided: it is (1) a "causal" principle explaining the origin (...) of all that exists, and (2) a semantic principle concerning the mutual dependency of concepts and beliefs in both the systematic and historically contingent sense. The latter implies a pragmatic approach to meaning. (shrink)

There are hints that the connectivity of space-time in quantum gravity could emerge from entanglement, and it has further been proposed that any two entangled particles may be connected by a quantum wormhole. One way to test this proposal is by probing the electric field of an entangled charged particle to determine whether its electric field leaks through the putative wormhole. In addition, if such a wormhole is traversable, then it could be possible for the collapse of the wave function (...) to occur in a causal manner, with information about the collapse travelling through the wormhole at the speed of light, rather than the wave function collapse being a global and instantaneous event. (shrink)

It is a testament to the progress of empirical inquiry into mass incarceration that it has already yielded and transcended a “standard story.” By contrast, mass incarceration is only just beginning to emerge as a particular problem for the philosophy of punishment. In this chapter, Ewing offers a critical review of recent work by criminal law theorists, arguing that traditional justifications of punishment are ill-equipped to explain the distinctive injustice of mass incarceration. He then argues that the problem of (...) mass incarceration should force us to reconsider neglected distributive dimensions of criminal justice. And he begins to reflect on what appears unjust about mass incarceration when criminal justice is reconceived as the problem of how to produce and fairly allocate security against crime and punishment. (shrink)

Chad Hansen is one of the strongest proponents of the view that the important second chapter of Zhuangzi's Inner Chapters (The Qi Wu Lun) reveals Zhuangzi to be a relativistic sceptidst. Hansen argues that Zhuangzi is a sceptic because he is first and foremost a relativist. Hansen's argument is essentially that Zhuangzi's perspectivism, his belief that one's linguistic and conceptual perspective determines what one claims to know, makes him a thorough going relativist and sceptic. I agree that Zhuangzi is a (...) perspectivist, but disagree with Hansen's portrayal of him as a relativistic sceptic. I first show that there is an important ambiguity in Hansen's argument. I then proceed to argue that important passages in the Qi Wu Lun (in particular the butterfly dream passage,) reveal serious problems with Hansen's interpretation of Zhuangzi's philosophical stance, I maintain that Zhuangzi is neither a sceptic nor a perspectival relativist. He is rather a perspectival realist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Doctrine of PratītyasamutpādaEwing ChinnIt seems fitting that the very last verse of Nāgārjuna's challenging work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way), would present the reader with what seems to be a riddle: "I prostrate to Gautama, who through compassion, taught the true doctrine, which leads to the relinquishing of all views" (27 :30). This should be read with an earlier verse (13 : 8): "The victorious (...) ones have said that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. For whomever emptiness is a view, that one will accomplish nothing."1 Since the last chapter deals with questions about the self and the world, it is understandable that so many commentators would assume that the "true doctrine" of which Nāgārjuna speaks is the doctrine of śūnyatā, but that gives a paradoxical character to these verses. Gautama recommends to us a doctrine that all this (we and all that we experience of the world) is śūnya, that is, empty of essence and thus of inherent, independent existence. And does this anti-realist, anti-essentialist view of things (as some would interpret śūnyatā) make possible and even constitute the relinquishing of all views, including his own? It cannot simply be the trivial and disingenuous claim that to accept the truth of śūnyatā is to relinquish all other wrong views. So is Nāgārjuna mysteriously refuting himself? Or is he uttering a paradox?I will argue that there is no paradox or problem of self-refutation, because the true doctrine that Nāgārjuna refers to is not śūnyatā but the doctrine of pratītyasa-mutpāda (dependent arising or origination). And what the verses assert is that if we understand and accept this doctrine, we will no longer have the need or inclination to hold any view about the nature of things, including the inclination to construct a view out of the declaration that "all this is śūnya." How this is possible, how accepting the doctrine makes possible the "relinquishing of all views," certainly depends on what kind of doctrine this is and how it is to be distinguished from a "view." Part of my argument, of course, is that neither pratītyasamutpāda nor the assertion that "all this is śūnya" should be taken as even implying any metaphysical views—either nihilism, absolutism, or anti-realism (the most common metaphysical interpretations). There is no doubt that a major target of Nāgārjuna's philosophical criticism is metaphysical realism. But this does not mean that the critic must hold some alternative metaphysical view.The logical place to begin is chapter 1, "Examination of Conditions," where the subject of discussion is the concept of pratītyasamutpāda, but it is not clear at all what Nāgārjuna is trying to establish about this concept. Jay Garfield, in his recent translation of and commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā titled The Fundamental Wisdom of the MiddleWay, offers a unique interpretation of the point of this chapter, [End Page 54] and I will follow him to some extent in his analysis of the text.2 However, we will part ways at a crucial point in the chapter with regard to what Nāgārjuna is about.On the Nature and Significance of PratītyasamutpādaIn this first chapter, Garfield notes that "Nāgārjuna distinguishes two possible views of dependent origination or the causal process—one according to which causes bring about their effects in virtue of causal powers and one according to which causal relations simply amount to explanatorily useful regularities—and defends the latter."3 That is to say, according to Garfield, Nāgārjuna defends pratītyasamutpāda as a regularity or Humean theory of causation against an essentialist or realist interpretation. The latter contends that while we may cite one or more factors or events as the causal condition of some effect, it is the force or power in these conditions that is actually the cause of the effect. Nāgārjuna's basic criticism of this realist view is summarized in the fourth verse:Power to act does not have conditions. There... (shrink)

Air temperature prediction can play a significant role in studies related to climate change, radiation and heat flux estimation, and weather forecasting. This study applied and compared the outcomes of three advanced fuzzy inference models, i.e., dynamic evolving neural-fuzzy inference system, hybrid neural-fuzzy inference system, and adaptive neurofuzzy inference system for AT prediction. Modelling was done for three stations in North Dakota, USA, i.e., Robinson, Ada, and Hillsboro. The results reveal that FIS type models are well suited when handling highly (...) variable data, such as AT, which shows a high positive correlation with average daily dew point, total solar radiation, and negative correlation with average wind speed. At the Robinson station, DENFIS performed the best with a coefficient of determination of 0.96 and a modified index of agreement of 0.92, followed by ANFIS with R2 of 0.94 and md of 0.89, and HyFIS with R2 of 0.90 and md of 0.84. A similar result was observed for the other two stations, i.e., Ada and Hillsboro stations where DENFIS performed the best with R2: 0.953/0.960, md: 0.903/0.912, then ANFIS with R2: 0.943/0.942, md: 0.888/0.890, and HyFIS with R2: 0.908/0.905, md: 0.845/0.821, respectively. It can be concluded that all three models are capable of predicting AT with high efficiency by only using DP, TSR, and WS as input variables. This makes the application of these models more reliable for a meteorological variable with the need for the least number of input variables. The study can be valuable for the areas where the climatological and seasonal variations are studied and will allow providing excellent prediction results with the least error margin and without a huge expenditure. (shrink)

According to many critics, Descartes argued in a circle when he presumed to base the certainty (and thus knowledge) of propositions that fulfill his epistemic criterion of being “clearly and distinctly perceived” on the demonstration that God exists and is not a deceiver. But his critics say, that demonstration, as he presented it, presupposed the validity of the same epistemic criterion. I critically examine two major strategies to dispel the appearance of circularity, two ways of interpreting Descartes’ argument.My approach shares (...) with the second strategy the contention that Descartes did adopt the principle that “whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived to be true is true,” prior to his consideration of the God question. Moreover, his demonstration of God’s existence and veracity made use of the principle. But my claim is that the knowledge of God’s existence and veracity is not used to validate the principle of clear and distinct perception (that would be unnecessary). It is used rather to defeat the sceptic’s argument that we cannot have any knowledge of the external, physical world. I proceed to present and explain Descartes’ argument centered around the thesis, “I cannot be certain that (r) any of my representational ideas of the external world are veridical, unless I am certain that (q), God exists and is not a deceiver.” That is, I prove why, for Descartes, (q) is necessary for (r). My discussion exposes some new facets to the principle of clear and distinct perception and reveals the fact that some familiar Cartesian distinctions that were not thought to be relevant to the problem of the Cartesian Circle are crucial to the solution of that problem. (shrink)

The claim that there are incommensurable conceptual schemes through which different cultures see the world (or see their worlds) poses a challenge to the viability of comparative philosophy that cannot be easily dismissed. Donald Davidson’s famous attack on the very idea of alternative conceptual schemes through his rejection of the “third dogma of empiricism,” the dogma of the absolute distinction between scheme and content, has never been very well understood. I will argue that the rejection of the dogma enables Davidson (...) to adopt a realist position (as opposed to the anti-realist position of Rorty, who endorses the rejection)and forms the basis for his theory of radical interpretation, supported by his “principle of charity.” And I will use John Dewey’s “postulate of immediate empiricism” to explain Davidson’s views. Together they provide a way to meet the challenge of conceptual relativism. (shrink)

The claim that there are incommensurable conceptual schemes through which different cultures see the world (or see their worlds) poses a challenge to the viability of comparative philosophy that cannot be easily dismissed. Donald Davidson’s famous attack on the very idea of alternative conceptual schemes through his rejection of the “third dogma of empiricism,” the dogma of the absolute distinction between scheme and content, has never been very well understood. I will argue that the rejection of the dogma enables Davidson (...) to adopt a realist position (as opposed to the anti-realist position of Rorty, who endorses the rejection)and forms the basis for his theory of radical interpretation, supported by his “principle of charity.” And I will use John Dewey’s “postulate of immediate empiricism” to explain Davidson’s views. Together they provide a way to meet the challenge of conceptual relativism. (shrink)

Previous studies of initiatives in Writing to Learn and Writing Across the Curriculum/Writing in the Disciplines, while showing gains in knowledge retention and improvement in general writing skills, have not yet investigated the more fundamental issue of how writing supports development of domain-specific forms of thinking. Written samples were gathered from prospective teachers engaged in a year-long program of classroom observation and participation designed to advance their understanding of student success and failure. Ethnographic and quantitative methods provided evidence that their (...) written accounts indicated an increased understanding that was aligned with the goals of the program. (shrink)

Previous studies of initiatives in Writing to Learn and Writing Across the Curriculum/Writing in the Disciplines, while showing gains in knowledge retention and improvement in general writing skills, have not yet investigated the more fundamental issue of how writing supports development of domain-specific forms of thinking. Written samples were gathered from prospective teachers engaged in a year-long program of classroom observation and participation designed to advance their understanding of student success and failure. Ethnographic and quantitative methods provided evidence that their (...) written accounts indicated an increased understanding that was aligned with the goals of the program. (shrink)

According to many critics, Descartes argued in a circle when he presumed to base the certainty (and thus knowledge) of propositions that fulfill his epistemic criterion of being “clearly and distinctly perceived” on the demonstration that God exists and is not a deceiver. But his critics say, that demonstration, as he presented it, presupposed the validity of the same epistemic criterion. I critically examine two major strategies to dispel the appearance of circularity, two ways of interpreting Descartes’ argument.My approach shares (...) with the second strategy the contention that Descartes did adopt the principle that “whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived to be true is true,” prior to his consideration of the God question. Moreover, his demonstration of God’s existence and veracity made use of the principle. But my claim is that the knowledge of God’s existence and veracity is not used to validate the principle of clear and distinct perception (that would be unnecessary). It is used rather to defeat the sceptic’s argument that we cannot have any knowledge of the external, physical world. I proceed to present and explain Descartes’ argument centered around the thesis, “I cannot be certain that (r) any of my representational ideas of the external world are veridical, unless I am certain that (q), God exists and is not a deceiver.” That is, I prove why, for Descartes, (q) is necessary for (r). My discussion exposes some new facets to the principle of clear and distinct perception and reveals the fact that some familiar Cartesian distinctions that were not thought to be relevant to the problem of the Cartesian Circle are crucial to the solution of that problem. (shrink)

While for a long time the study of medieval logic focused on editorial projects and reconstructions of central medieval doctrines such as the theories of signification, supposition, consequences, and obligations, nowadays the spectrum of analysis has broadened and is increasingly informed by modern logical research, whose perspective is then applied to medieval logic. Promoting this tendency, logicians and researchers concerned with semantics in the Gesellschaft für Philosophie des Mittelalters und der Renaissance (GPMR) founded a working group bringing together medieval logic (...) and modern applied logic. The present volume is a seminal document of these interests and activities. It analyzes theories in medieval logic which are useful for solving questions of recent logic and explains crucial parts of medieval logic, philosophy, and theology by applying techniques of present-day logic. (shrink)

First published in 1934, this book evaluates the characteristic doctrines of the idealism which dominated philosophy during the last century. It seeks to combine realism, as to epistemology and physical objects, with a greater appreciation of views which emphasize the unity and rationality of the universe. This work is not a history and does not try to compete with any histories of idealism but it instead reaches an independent conclusion on certain philosophical problems by criticising what others have said. The (...) book considers differing arguments in order to determine their validity. (shrink)

This concise volume is at once an excellent introduction to Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonand an original analysis of Kant's ideas.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a handful of legal theorists addressed the problem of criminal justice for offenders who faced criminogenic social disadvantages. Their discussions were provocative but alternatively unpersuasive and underdeveloped. More recently, in the wake of mass incarceration in America, philosophers have put forth new analyses that make important headway but remain scattered, partial, and in need of a systematic and integrated review. In this article, I reconstruct and critique the most prominent and well-developed explanations yet offered of (...) the distinctive moral problems that offenders’ criminogenic social disadvantages may pose for criminal justice. I conclude that some views are misguided, others are unduly limited, and one – based on the ideals of fair opportunity to avoid crime and punishment – is particularly promising but as yet underdeveloped. (shrink)

The application of recycled aggregate as a sustainable material in construction projects is considered a promising approach to decrease the carbon footprint of concrete structures. Prediction of compressive strength of environmentally friendly concrete containing recycled aggregate is important for understanding sustainable structures’ concrete behaviour. In this research, the capability of the deep learning neural network approach is examined on the simulation of CS of EF concrete. The developed approach is compared to the well-known artificial intelligence approaches named multivariate adaptive regression (...) spline, extreme learning machines, and random forests. The dataset was divided into three scenarios 70%-30%, 80%-20%, and 90%-10% for training/testing to explore the impact of data division percentage on the capacity of the developed AI model. Extreme gradient boosting was integrated with the developed AI models to select the influencing variables on the CS prediction. Several statistical measures and graphical methods were generated to evaluate the efficiency of the presented models. In this regard, the results confirmed that the DLNN model attained the highest value of prediction performance with minimal root mean squared error. The study revealed that the highest prediction performance could be attained by increasing the number of variables in the prediction problem and using 90%-10% data division. The results demonstrated the robustness of the DLNN model over the other AI models in handling the complex behaviour of concrete. Due to the high accuracy of the DLNN model, the developed method can be used as a practical approach for future use of CS prediction of EF concrete. (shrink)

Retributivism is often portrayed as a rights-respecting alternative to consequentialist justifications of punishment. However, I argue that the political legitimacy of retribution is doubtful precisely because retribution privileges a controversial conception of the good over citizens’ rights and more widely shared, publicly accessible interests. First, even if retribution is valuable, the best accounts of its value fail to show that it can override or partially nullify offenders’ rights to the fundamental forms of liberty of which criminal punishment paradigmatically deprives them. (...) Second, the importance of publicly justifying basic forms of coercion on the basis of broadly shared values is a good reason to think that the state should not punish for retribution even those citizens whose actions have created a state interest in punishing them that overrides or partially nullifies their presumptive rights. (shrink)

In his book, Being?in?the?World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, Hubert Dreyfus argues that Heidegger's concept of authenticity is incomprehensible. He maintains that there are two conflicting accounts of inauthenticity in Being and Time. He elucidates what he calls the ?structural account? of inauthenticity and being?in?the?world in the main body of his work, and then criticizes what he calls the ?motivational account? in an Appendix. Because he overlooks certain textual evidence and underemphasizes fleeing and the role of (...) choice, his interpretation is neither complete nor compelling. I offer an alternative interpretation of authenticity. While Heidegger's notion of authenticity may still be weakened by other flaws, it is not incomprehensible in the sense that Dreyfus contends. (shrink)

This article suggests a way to circumvent some of the problems that follow from the lack of consensus on a definition of emotion (Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981) and emotion regulation (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004) by adopting a conceptual framework based on discrete emotions theory and focusing on specific emotions. Discrete emotions theories assume that neural, affective, and cognitive processes differ across specific emotions and that each emotion has particular motivational and regulatory functions. Thus, efforts at regulation should (...) target the specific dysregulated emotions. The positive effects of emotion regulation are more likely to be optimized when they result from or lead to emotion utilization—the constructive use of the energy of emotion arousal. Effective processes for regulation differ for basic emotions and emotion schemas. This article identifies neural systems that facilitate emotion experiences and emotion regulation processes. It considers the implications of the developmental change from basic emotions to emotion schemas, and also briefly discusses the effects of interventions on changes in emotion knowledge, emotion regulation, and social and emotional competence. (shrink)

Ewing, Selena R Sometimes we find a question in bioethics that seems so mundane and common that nobody cares to consider it, and yet it has no easy answer. The question of my current research project is this. When an elderly person, perhaps your parent or your patient, says 'I don't want to be a burden,' what do they mean and how should we respond?

Ewing, Selena R Sometimes we find a question in bioethics that seems so mundane and common that nobody cares to consider it, and yet it has no easy answer. The question of my current research project is this. When an elderly person, perhaps your parent or your patient, says 'I don't want to be a burden,' what do they mean and how should we respond?

Mitigating factors may seem either to be partially exculpatory factors considered at sentencing or else disparate reasons of public policy other than a defendant’s diminished culpability why he should be punished less harshly. I argue, however, that there is a set of factors at the core of mitigation that are distinct from partially exculpatory factors, yet do not encompass just any non-exculpatory factor relevant to sentencing. Mitigating factors of this undertheorized kind do not diminish a defendant’s culpability. But they are (...) more than mere reasons to mitigate his punishment. They are factors that strengthen his complaint against punishment, thereby giving him a claim to mitigation—even if not a moral or legal right to it. Hence, there are three types of mitigating factors: partially exculpatory mitigating factors, mere public policy reasons for mitigation, and defendant claims to mitigation without exculpation. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna contends that the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda , properly understood, constitutes the philosophical basis for the rejection and avoidance of all metaphysical theories and concepts . The companion doctrine of "śūnyatā" constitutes the denial of metaphysical realism but does not imply an anti-realist, conventionalist view of reality . "Pratītyasamutpāda," the true doctrine or, literally, "the exact or real nature of the case," is really two-sided: it is a "causal" principle explaining the origin of all that exists, and a semantic principle (...) concerning the mutual dependency of concepts and beliefs in both the systematic and historically contingent sense. The latter implies a pragmatic approach to meaning. (shrink)

Ewing, Selena This paper is part of a larger body of research which was partly supported by a grant from the Mary Phillippa Brazill Foundation.

'This is a powerful piece of advocacy. I'd pick Ewing and Gearty for my counsels any day.' -Bernard Porter, LRBThis book is an account of the struggle for civil liberties against the State in which groups such as the anti-war protestors, the Irish nationalists, the Communist party, trade unionists, and the unemployed workers' movement found themselves involved in the first half of the twentieth century. All had to fight for their civil liberties in the face of strong opposition from (...) the State, including the judges whose attitude to civil liberties was often deeply hostile, and at odds with their supposed role as defenders of freedom. (shrink)

This is a major work by one of the best-known philosophical writers, representing the culmination of some twenty-five years’ work on the possibility of giving a rational defence of the claims of the religious man, and specifically the theist, in the face of modern criticisms. Dr Ewing’s object has been to fulfil what seem to him the two most important tasks for the philosopher in at least the present age, namely, to see if it is still possible to give (...) a rational defence of a genuinely religious point of view, and to do the same thing for an objective ethics, a task he has attempted in other works, and continues here. The conclusions are that while there can be no question of strict, logical proof, an ethical theism can be defended rationally as an explanatory, metaphysical hypothesis and there are no grounds to reject as illusory the most fundamental intuitive convictions of religion. The book, originally published in 1973, included a new theory of the ultimate criterion of truth for hypotheses, a restatement of the case for a substantial self and for indeterminism, a fresh treatment of the moral and certain other arguments for God, some points in the discussion of the problem of evil and some speculations on time. (shrink)

It is often thought that an agent is blameworthy only for wrongdoing she had a fair opportunity to avoid. However, in this article, I defend the thesis that there is a form of culpability for wrongdoing—exemplified by criminal guilt—that it is possible to accrue even for wrongdoing one lacked a fair opportunity to avoid. If I am right that criminal guilt, properly conceived, is not something everyone necessarily has a fair opportunity to avoid, an offender’s lack of fair opportunity to (...) avoid her guilt would appear to be an important potential ground for mitigation at sentencing. Hence, the thesis of this article may point the way toward a novel explanation of a moral intuition that a coterie of moral, political, and legal theorists has for decades sought but struggled to vindicate: the intuition that offenders who have suffered from various social disadvantages should receive less punishment for their crimes, even when those crimes are not morally justified or excused. (shrink)

Ender's Game, at face value, is a story about a young yet mature and extraordinarily gifted boy manipulated into saving the world. At another level, though, Ender's story raises ethical questions about war, leadership, and character. Perhaps the most important thing about the story is what it says about the virtues that make for good leadership. This chapter looks at Ender's story through the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, two philosophers deeply concerned with the virtues of leadership. Plato's concept of (...) virtue rests on two ideas: his analogy between the three‐part human soul and the state, and his four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Aristotle's virtues fall into two broad categories: intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtues sharpen our capacity to reason, whereas moral virtues order the “passive” part of the soul that only acts rationally by following the lead of others. (shrink)

SUMMARYIn recent years students of politics have begun to recognise Reinhart Koselleck's practice of Begriffsgeschichte, the study of conceptual history, as a useful approach for investigating key concepts in political ideologies and the history of ideas. But his theory of historical time—the temporal dimension to his semantic project and his broader theorising of the historical discipline—is often overlooked and underused as a heuristic device. By placing the thinking of Michael Oakeshott alongside Koselleck's theory of historical time, this article brings his (...) thinking on temporality to the forefront, fashioning a conversation between the two thinkers about the place for history and the formal criteria necessary for ordering the past properly. In doing so, it juxtaposes Koselleck's reflections on historicity and his theory of historical time with Oakeshott's philosophical enquiry on the historical mode of understanding. It identifies important convergences and divergences between the two thinkers' theories, focusing in particular on questions regarding the potential for representing the past as multilayered and plural historical times. The article then suggests that their respective thoughts on the theory of history are in part a reaction to the modern politicisation of historical time and comprise a shared critique of radical political change. (shrink)

This thesis considers the relationship between the ontology of time and the passage of time, and concludes that the best way to understand this relationship is found in the combination of eternalism with the view that the passage of time is an objective, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal world. The steps I take to reach this conclusion are as follows: first, I propose that eternalism is the best ontological basis from which to consider temporal passage; second, I argue that the (...) moving spotlight theory, which attempts to reconcile eternalism with temporal passage, is an inadequate representation of the relationship between eternalism and temporal passage; third, I suggest that temporal passage is best understood as a mind-independent phenomenon. I argue that eternalism is preferable to presentism insofar as presentism suffers from inconsistencies that eternalism both avoids and easily solves. I then defend the rejection of the moving spotlight theory by an appeal to the incoherency of the moving now. Finally, I dismiss mind-dependent temporal passage in favour of mind-independent temporal passage based on the irreducibility of temporal passage in and of itself. (shrink)